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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1994, The Wall Street Journal reported that Kenneth
Dart, billionaire and president of Dart Container, which controls
a large share of the U.S. foam cup market, avoided paying mil-
lions in U.S. taxes by renouncing his U.S. citizenship.1 Dart
chose to give up his citizenship in order to become a citizen of
Belize, a Central American country widely known as a tax ha-
ven.2 Through his formal expatriation, 3 Dart avoided the pay-
ment of U.S. taxes on estate taxes, future earnings, and deferred
income (i.e. capital gains). Arguably, the lost benefits of U.S.
citizenship are greater than the gained benefits of Belizean citi-
zenship and tax-avoidance. 4 Dart, however, reaps the benefits of
1. Laurie P. Cohen, Kenneth Dart Forsakes US. for Belize, WALL ST. J., Mar. 28,
1994, at CI.
2. Id.
3. Expatriation is the "voluntary act of abandoning one's country, and becoming the
citizen or subject of another.* BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 576 (6th ed. 1990).
4. Although expatriation is an effective tax-avoidance device, it may not be profit-
able or convenient for a U.S. citizen to renounce his or her citizenship. An individual con-
sidering expatriating should weigh the tax savings that result from expatriating against
the following ancillary issues. First, the taxpayer should consider the flexibility of U.S.
nationality and immigration laws because he or she may want to visit the United States or
return if living abroad becomes intolerable. Second, a taxpayer should research the resi-
dent country's internal laws relating to foreign citizenship. For example, the issues of
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both U.S. citizenship and tax-avoidance. Although he is no
longer a U.S. citizen, Dart can visit, vacation, or live part of the
year in the United States because Dart's family members re-
tained their U.S. citizenshipY The State Department, however,
rejected one element of Dart's plan when it denied his request to
make his home in Sarasota, Florida, the Belizean consulate. 6
The Kenneth Dart story is not entirely unusual. In addition
to The Wall Street Journal article on Dart, Forbes Magazine pub-
lished its own report which revealed a number of expatriation
incidents among America's super-rich.7 The list of high-profile,
wealthy expatriates include Ted Arison, founder of Carnival
Cruise Lines, who renounced citizenship to become an Israeli
citizen; John Dorrance III, Campbell Soup heir, who renounced
citizenship in favor of Ireland; and Michael Dingman, Chairman
of ABEX Corporation, who is now a Bahamian citizen.8
Expatriation is not threatening to become epidemic. It is
estimated that an average of 650 Americans expatriate annually
while 50,000 non-U.S. citizens apply for U.S. citizenship
monthly.9 Because those who do expatriate are generally ex-
whether the resident country will facilitate travel abroad or whether there are any fees
associated with the issuance of citizenship documents may be important factors to con-
sider. Third, an analysis of living costs and taxation in the new country is essential. Most
countries that are 'tax havens" have high costs of living; or alternatively, may charge high
customs or inheritance taxes. Fourth, if the taxpayer has source-income from another
country, he or she may want to consider the effect of tax treaties, and whether that par-
ticular treaty permits the source and resident country to tax the same income, or if the
income is taxed at the source, is that rate higher than the resident country. Thomas St.G.
Bissell, Can Wealthy U.S. Citizens Reduce Taxes Through Expatriation?, 22 EST. PLAN. 83
(1995).
5. This proposition is overly simplistic. Internal Revenue Code Section 7701 limits
the amount of time that Dart may actually remain present in the United States. If he is
present in the United States for thirty-one days or less, then there are no tax conse-
quences. However, under Subsection (b) of Section 7701, Dart is treated like a U.S. resi-
dent for tax purposes if he is present in the United States for more than thirty-one days in
year one and the sum of the days on which Dart was present in the United States during
the current year and the two preceding calendar years (when multiplied by the applicable
multiplier under Section 7701(b)(3)(ii)) equals or exceeds 183 days. This is subject to ex-
ception under the closer connection test set forth in Section 770 1(b)(3)(B).
6. Mark Albright, That's a Whole Lot of Yacht, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Dec. 4, 1995,
at Bus. 2.
7. Robert Lenzner & Philippe Mao, The New Refugees: Americans Who Give Up
Citizenship to Save on Taxes, FORBES MAO., Nov. 21, 1994, at 131.
8. Karen De Witt, Some of the Rich FInd a Passport Lost is a Fortune Gained, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 12, 1995, at Al.
9. Detlev Vagts, The Proposed Expatriation Tax-A Human Rights ViolationV, 89
AM. J. INT'L L. 578 (1995).
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tremely wealthy, the Treasury Department contends that the
loss of tax revenue is substantial." It was this revenue loss,
coupled with the media attention surrounding these high profile
expatriates, that brought the issue of expatriation to the fore-
front of political debate. The Clinton Administration, the House
Ways and Means Committee, and the Senate Finance Committee
all proposed amendments to Section 877, the Internal Revenue
Code Section designed to recapture taxes from tax-motivated ex-
patriates." All three proposals sought to close a number of loop-
holes that expatriates had used to avoid the intended recapture
of taxes lost through formal expatriation. In September of 1996,
Congress enacted amendments to the "expatriation tax" in the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996.12
10, The Treasury Department estimates that the amended expatriation tax will gen-
erate approximately $100 million without treaty override, or $450 million with treaty
override, over the next five years. Testimony of U.S. Treasury's Samuels At Finance Hear-
ing On Taxation Of Expatriates, 95 TAX NOTES INT'L 134-14 (1995). [hereinafter Samuels
Testimony]. See discussion of treaty override infra Part V.
11. The House Ways and Means Committee, the Senate Finance Committee and the
Clinton Administration submitted separate and divergent proposed amendments to the
original expatriation tax. Each proposal purported to close the loopholes that made the
original expatriation tax an effective tax-avoidance device. See infra Part I.B. (discussing
the loopholes in the original expatriation tax). In addition to targeting the loopholes in the
original expatriation tax, each included a provision that would impose a departure tax on
long-term residents who relinquish residency.
The Clinton Administration and Senate Finance Committee's proposals were
very similar. Under either approach, a U.S. citizen relinquishing citizenship, or a long-
term resident relinquishing residency, was treated as if all assets were sold for fair market
value immediately before expatriation. Gain would be recognized on this "deemed sale"
only if the taxpayer's assets or retirement plans exceeded six-hundred-thousand dollars or
the taxpayer's five-year average annual income was one-hundred-thousand dollars. The
"deemed sale" provision was not included in the amendments to the original expatriation
tax. Congress did use the income scale as the sole method for determining whether a citi-
zen's primary motive for expatriating was tax-motivated.
The most conservative proposal was submitted by the House Ways and Means
Committee. This approach was the closest to existing legislation. Under this proposal, a
former citizen is taxed following formal expatriation on certain assets producing United
States-source income for a ten-year period as if the expatriate was still a U.S. citizen. The
only significant difference between the original expatriation tax and the House Ways and
Means proposal is that the proposal eliminates the subjective motivation test and replaces
it with an objective wealth test. See discussion infra Part III.A.
The amended expatriation tax enacted by Congress and signed by President Clin-
ton closely resembles the House Ways and Means proposal incorporating a few principles
from the Senate Finance Committee and Clinton Administration's proposals. The Senate
and House hearings are rich with information on how tax-avoidance or, alternatively,
treaty override can be accomplished under each proposal. For a brief synopsis on defi-
ciencies in these proposals, see Christine L. Agnew, The Proposed Expatriation Tax and Its
Impact On International Tax Treaties, 14 INTL L.Q. 1 (Summer 1996).
12. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191,
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This Comment will argue that the amended expatriation tax
is an over broad and ineffective means for accomplishing the in-
tended objectives. In fact, the refined mechanism for enforcing
the expatriation tax has opened the door to new problems: arbi-
trary enforcement and conflict with international tax treaties.
Part II analyzes the need for an expatriation tax, the mechanics
of the original expatriation tax, and the abuse which led to the
enactment of the amended expatriation tax. Part III discusses
the recent amendments to the expatriation tax and explains the
significance of the changes. Parts IV and V illustrate the arbi-
trary enforcement which may arise when a court is deciding
whether to enforce the amended expatriation tax. Specifically,
Part IV demonstrates how a taxpayer could convince a court that
enforcement of the amended expatriation tax undermines con-
gressional intent, undermines treaty partners' intent, and mate-
rially violates international tax treaties. Conversely, Part V
demonstrates how the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue
Service (Commissioner) could argue that Congress intended the
expatriation tax to violate tax treaties, an acceptable practice
under the "later-in-time" rule. In addition, the failure to enforce
the amended expatriation tax rewards the unscrupulous for
treaty-shopping and penalizes the principled for failing to do the
same. Part VI considers alternatives to treaty conflict and arbi-
trary enforcement. Finally, Part VII examines policy aspects of
the amended expatriation tax.
1. BACKGROUND
The U.S. tax system is unique, particularly regarding juris-
diction. Income and estate taxes are based on citizenship and
residence.13 The U.S. tax system rests on a broad exercise of
taxing jurisdiction that extends to aliens residing within the
United States and U.S. citizens living abroad.14 The system
breaks down, however, in the areas of deferred income and estate
§ 511, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) 1936, 2093 (to be codified at I.R.C. § 877).
13. Compare the Canadian tax system where taxes are based solely on residency. An
individual residing in the country for more than 184 days is required to pay Canadian
taxes. Diane Francis, Canada; It's Unfair That Non-Residents Can Avoid Paying Taxes,
FIN. POST, Apr. 13, 1995, at 19.
14. The Sixteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution gives Congress 'the power to
lay and collect taxes on income, from whatever source derived, and without regard to any
census or enumeration.' U.S. CONST. amend. XVI. See also I.R.C. § 61 (1996) (defining
gross income as 'income from whatever source derived').
19961
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taxes.
American estate taxes rates reach as high as fifty-five per-
cent, 15 among the highest in the industrialized world.
16 These ex-
pensive tax rates can be avoided by renouncing citizenship be-
cause the United States does not tax a deceased foreigner's
estate. 17  Therefore, expatriation is an advantageous tax-
avoidance device in the estate planning context.
18
Another avenue for tax-avoidance is in the area of deferred
income. Many corporate executives, like Dart, take portions of
their salaries in investment form like stock. The money made
when the stock is sold is taxed at a lower rate and at a later
date. 19 This has a two-fold tax benefit: 1) it allows the taxpayer
to defer payment of taxes; and 2) it decreases the rate at which
such income would ordinarily be taxed. Similarly, shareholders
receiving a stock dividend that receives nonrecognition treatment
under Section 306 of the Internal Revenue Code are afforded the
opportunity to shelter income until such stock is sold. The oppor-
tunity to shelter income and to receive a capital gain rate oper-
ates as an incentive to invest. The benefits received are subject
to a recapture of taxes at a later date, such as when stock is sold.
Expatriates who renounce citizenship before any income is real-
ized escape recapture of taxes.20 If income is realized after citi-
15. I.R.C. § 2001(c)(1) (1996).
16. Bissell, aupra note 4, at 83.
17. But see I.R.C, § 2101(a) (1996) (imposing a tax on a transferred taxable estate de-
scribed in Section 2106 which limits the estate tax to that portion of the decedent's estate
situated within the United States). For tax-avoidance purposes, the expatriate would
avoid paying estate taxes on all property outside of the territorial United States.
18. But eee Hay v. Commissioner, 145 F.2d 1001, 1003 (4th Cir. 1944) (finding that a
former citizen who expatriated to avoid potential death duties had to pay taxes on the tax-
able gain involving a transaction that occurred while the former citizen was a resident of
Nassau in the Bahama Islands). The court stated: "We do not think that a taxpayer can
avoid the incidence of an income tax by splitting a transaction into nontaxable parts if a
taxable gain is derived from the transaction considered in its entirety." Id. at 1004.
19. An employee who renders services in exchange for stock in a corporation is taxed
as ordinary income on the fair market value of the stock, if that value is ascertainable, on
the date such stock is issued. That value becomes the taxpayer's basis in the stock. The
tax advantage of this transaction occurs on the disposition of the stock. The recognition
rules under Section 1001 require income to be recognized and realized upon the disposition
of property, and in this example, stock. The capital character of gain or loss recognized on
the disposition of the stock is governed by Section 1221, provided that the stock is not held
for inventory purposes, subject to a holding period set forth in Section 1223.
20. But see I.R.C. § 897(a)(2)(A)(ii) (1996) (taxing a nonresident alien on the gain real-
ized on the disposition of real property); I.R.C. § 871(a)(2) (1996) (taxing the gain on the
disposition of United States-source capital assets of a nonresident alien present in the
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zenship is lost, the United States lacks jurisdiction to collect
taxes on that deferred income.
The underlying economic policy, facilitating tax breaks to
foreigners, is sound. For example, it is clear that the United
States declines to impose a capital gains tax on foreigners be-
cause such an imposition would discourage foreign investment.
However, this policy is frustrated when Americans in high tax
brackets relinquish citizenship to take advantage of foreign tax
breaks.
A The Original Expatriation Tax
In 1966, Congress enacted a tax to prevent expatriation
abuses in the capital gain and estate planning contexts.21 Codi-
fied in Internal Revenue Code Section 877(a), the expatriation
tax provided:
Every nonresident alien individual who at any time after
March 8, 1965, and within the 10-year period immediately
preceding the close of the taxable year lost United States citi-
zenship, unless such loss did not have for one of its principal
purposes the avoidance of taxes under this subtitle or subtitle
B, shall be taxable for such taxable year in the manner pro-
vided in subsection (b) if the tax imposed pursuant to such
subsection exceeds the tax which, without regard to this sec-
tion, is imposed pursuant to section 871.22
Under the expatriation tax, a special taxation regime applied
to a U.S. citizen who renounced citizenship, but only if the loss of
citizenship was principally tax-motivated.23 Determinations re-
garding a taxpayer's principal motive for expatriating only re-
quired the Secretary of the Treasury (Secretary) to establish that
it was reasonable to believe that, but for this Section, the tax-
payer would receive a significant tax benefit. 24 The burden then
shifted to the taxpayer to prove that his or her motive was not
tax-avoidance despite the significant tax benefits gained through
United States for more than 183 days).
21. Foreign Investors Tax Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520, 1620-1624.
22. I.R.C. § 877(a) (1996).
23. Id.
24. I.R.C. § 877(e) (1998).
1996]
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expatriation.25 If the expatriate failed, the former citizen was
taxed for the ten year period following formal expatriation.
26
Double taxation and fiscal evasion were serious concerns un-
der the original expatriation tax.27 Double taxation occurred if
the taxpayer became a citizen or resident of a country that taxed
the same income 28 and an existing tax treaty did not cede taxing
jurisdiction.2 9 Fiscal evasion occurred when both the taxpayer
and the taxpayer's new resident country failed to report to the
United States gain realized after the taxpayer relinquished citi-
zenship or residency. In response to the problem of double taxa-
tion and fiscal evasion, the United States renegotiated most tax
treaties to include a saving clause provision that dealt specifi-
cally with the issue of Section 877.
B. Tax-Avoidance Under the Original Expatriation
Tax
Although the original expatriation tax was Congress' re-
sponse to the use of expatriation as a tax-avoidance device in the
capital gain and estate planning contexts, tax-motivated expatri-
ates found three separate loopholes in the tax that enabled them
to continue avoiding U.S. taxes.
The first loophole arose when a tax-motivated expatriate
manipulated the subjective motivation test used to determine the
taxpayer's motive for expatriating.30 Internal Revenue Code
Section 877(e), set forth the burden of proof for establishing
whether a citizen's motivation for expatriating was tax-
avoidance. It provided:
If the Secretary establishes that it is reasonable to believe
that an individual's loss of United States citizenship would,
but for this section, result in a substantial reduction for the
25. Id.
26. I.R.C. § 877(a) (1996).
27. For a discussion of these concerns under the amended expatriation tax, see infrca
text accompanying notes 64-67.
28. For example, the taxpayer in Revenue Ruling 79-152 expatriated to another
country. Subsequently, the taxpayer realized a large capital gain on his U.S. capital as-
sets. The United States and the taxpayer's new country wanted to tax the gain on United
States-source income. Rev. Rul. 79-152, 1979-1 C.B. 237.
29. See discussion infra Parts IV, V.
30. I.R.C. § 877(a) (1996).
[Vol. 28:1
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taxable year in the taxes on his probable income for such
year, the burden of proving for such taxable year that such
loss of citizenship did not have for one of its principal pur-
poses the avoidance of taxes under this subtitle or subtitle B
shall be on such individual.
3 '
The taxpayer's burden of proof has an extremely low
threshold primarily because it is difficult, if not impossible, to
prove that the taxpayer's subjective motive for expatriating is not
principally tax-motivated.
32
A second loophole in the tax existed for the "patient expatri-
ate." Under the original expatriation tax, there was a finite pe-
riod, ten years, within which a taxable event had to occur in or-
der for the government to tax the realized income. 33 If the
taxpayer survived and did not sell any assets during the ten-year
period, there was no taxable event to trigger any U.S. taxes. In
the meantime, however, the expatriate was not completely pro-
hibited from enjoying the fruits of his or her assets. The tax-
payer could use the assets as collateral to secure a loan, and al-
though the taxpayer had effectively liquidated the asset without
selling it, there was no taxable event because a loan with a cor-
responding obligation to repay is not a taxable event.
3 4
The third loophole arose in the area of foreign investments.
Foreign assets acquired while the taxpayer was a U.S. citizen
were not taxed upon expatriation. 35 Therefore, a U.S. citizen
who acquired foreign assets during his or her citizenship, and
subsequently expatriated, never paid taxes on the disposition of
that property. As long as the investor chose a foreign jurisdiction
with lower tax rates, the investor was able to escape U.S. taxes
and create substantial tax savings.
31. I.R.C. § 877(e) (1996).
32. Dart expatriated to Belize in order to increase his personal security. However,
Dart is not the first to provide an attenuated 'non-tax-avoidance" reason for expatriating.
Michael Dingnmn, Chairman of ABEX Corporation, explained that his reason for expatri-
ating was not tax-avoidance, rather he always wanted to become a Bahamian citizen. See
De Witt, supra note 8, at Al.
33. I.R.C. § 877(a) (1996).
34. Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1 (1947).
35. I.R.C. § 877(c) (1996) provides in part: [T]he following items of gross income shall
be treated as income from within the United States: (1) SALE OF PROPERTY... located in
the United States. (2) STOCK OR DEBT OBLIGATIONS.-Gains on the sale or exchange of
stock issued by a domestic corporation or debt obligations... .' Id.
1996]
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III. THE AMENDED EXPATRIATION TAX
In August 1996, Congress enacted three major amendments
to the expatriation tax.36 First, Congress replaced the subjective
motivation test with an objective wealth test.3 7 Second, Congress
expanded the tax to reach not only U.S. citizens, but also certain
long-term residents. 38 Finally, Congress recharacterized the
types of gain and income treated as United States-source income,
thereby expanding the range of income subject to the expatria-
tion tax.3 9
A. The Objective Wealth Test Replaces the
Subjective Motivation Test
The subjective motivation test applied under the original ex-
patriation tax, which required the Secretary to prove the expa-
triate had a tax-avoidance motive, has been largely replaced by
an objective wealth test which automatically creates a presump-
tion of a tax-avoidance motive for certain wealthy individuals.40
Under the amendments, a taxpayer is presumed to have a tax-
avoidance motive if the taxpayer's average annual income or to-
tal net assets exceeded a certain level.41
Under the amended expatriation tax, the Secretary no longer
carries the burden of establishing whether the taxpayer's pri-
36. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191,
§ 511, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) 1936, 2093 (to be codified at I.R.C. § 877).
37. Id. § 511(a) (to be codified at I.R.C. § 877(a)).
38. Id. § 511(g)(1)(B) (to be codified at I.R.C. § 877(d)).
39. Id. § 511(c) (to be codified at I.R.C. § 877(d)).
40. Id. § 511(a) (to be codified at I.R.C. § 877(a)).
41. Id. The criteria are contained in the now objective wealth test which provides:
(2) CERTAIN INDIVIDUALS TREATED AS HAVING A TAX-AVOIDANCE
PURPOSE.- For purposes of subsection (a), an individual shall be treated as
having a principal purpose to avoid tax if-
(A) the average annual net income (as defined in section 38(c)(1)) of such indi-
vidual for the period of 5 taxable years ending before the date of the loss of
United States citizenship is greater than $100,000, or
(B) the net worth of the individual as of such date is $500,000 or more.
In the case of the loss of United States citizenship in any calendar year after
1996, such $100,000 and $500,000 amounts shall be increased by an amount
equal to such dollar amount multiplied by the cost-of-living adjustment de-
termined under section 1(0)(3) .... Any increase shall be rounded to the near-
est multiple of $1,000.
[Vol. 28:1
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mary motive for expatriating was tax-avoidance. 42 Similarly, the
taxpayer no longer has the opportunity to rebut that presump-
tion with attenuated and unrealistic explanations. 43 As a result,
the amended tax has a larger net to recapture deferred income
and estate taxes. The tax not only captures those who previously
escaped taxes under the original expatriation tax by establishing
that their primary motive was not tax-avoidance, but it also cap-
tures those taxpayers who are expatriating for valid reasons.
44
There is a narrow list of exceptions to the presumption of
tax-avoidance under the objective wealth test. If certain taxpay-
ers file a ruling request with the Secretary within one year after
formal expatriation, the former citizen will not be subject to the
expatriation tax.45 To be eligible, a taxpayer must meet one of
the following criteria:
(1) was born with dual citizenship and retains citizenship in
the other country; (2) becomes a citizen of the country of the
individual's birth, the birth country of a spouse, or the birth
country of either parent; (3) terminates citizenship before the
age of 18 1/2; (4) was present in the United States for less
than 30 days each year of a ten-year period; or (5) is ex-
empted by regulation.
46
These exceptions only apply to U.S. citizens relinquishing




42. However, the subjective test remains in force for those that do not meet the cri-
teria of the objective wealth test. In those cases, the Secretary still must establish that it
is reasonable to believe the expatriate had a tax-avoidance motive. Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, § 511(), 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.) 1936,
2093 (to be codified at I.R.C. § 877) (redesignating the subjective test from I.R.C. § 877(e)-
(t)).
43. See, e.g., supra note 32.
44. Many expatriates relinquish citizenship and move to countries with tax rates
comparable to, or higher than, those imposed by the United States tax system. Joint
Comm. on Taxation, Issues Presented By Proposals to Modify the Tax Treatment of Expa-
triation, J.C.S. -17-95, (1995)[hereinafter Joint Comm. Report].
46. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191




B. Taxation of Long-Term Residents Terminating
Residency: Investors Go Home
Unlike the original expatriation tax, the amended expatria-
tion tax subjects former long-term residents to a tax on income
earned for ten years following the date of expatriation.48 For
purposes of Section 877, long-term permanent residents are those
individuals who lawfully reside as a permanent resident in the
United States for eight of the fifteen years preceding expatria-
tion.49 If the former long-term resident expatriates, meets the
objective wealth test and fails to establish residency in a juris-
diction that will not cede taxing jurisdiction to the United
States,5 he or she will be taxed for the ten years following expa-
triation "in the same manner as U.S. citizens who lose citizen-
ship"51 and may be taxed by his or her home country. The most
immediate effect of this provision is to discourage foreign inves-
tors seeking to build a commercial base or reside in the United
States for any significant amount of time.
C. Recharacterizing United States-Source Income
and Gain Under the Amended Expatriation Tax
The original expatriation tax limited taxation of expatriates
to gains on the sale or exchange of stock issued by a domestic
corporation. 52 Under the original expatriation tax, an expatriate
could restructure his or her interest in a corporation to avoid
taxes. For example, a controlling shareholder in a parent corpo-
ration could create a wholly owned foreign subsidiary by ex-
changing his or her shares in the parent corporation for shares in
the foreign subsidiary. This would be a tax-free reorganization
48. Id. § 511(0 (to be codified at I.R.C. § 87 7 (e)(1)).
49. Id. § 511(t) (to be codified at I.R.C. § 877(e)(2)).
50. A country would not cede taxing jurisdiction to the United States if the iniposi-
tion of the expatriation tax directly conflicts with the terms of a negotiated tax treaty. See
discussion infra Part IV.
51. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191,
§ 511(a), 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (Stat. 110) 1936, 2093 (to be codified at I.R.C. § 877(a)).
52. I.R.C. § 877(c) (1996).
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under the Internal Revenue Code.53 This reorganization allowed
the expatriate shareholder to avoid taxes on the disposition of
shares in the foreign subsidiary because the original expatriation
tax did not tax an expatriate's gain on the disposition of stock is-
sued by a foreign corporation. 54
The amended expatriation tax now taxes income and gains
derived from a foreign corporation in which the taxpayer owned a
fifty percent interest at the time of formal expatriation.55 The
taxpayer will be taxed "to the extent of earnings and profits
earned and accumulated before the termination of citizenship or
residency."56 In addition, an expatriate taxpayer will be taxed on
the disposition of property to a controlled foreign corporation.5 7 If
the taxpayer transfers property to a controlled foreign corpora-
tion, the taxpayer steps into the corporation's shoes. The tax-
payer, not the controlled foreign corporation, is taxed on the re-
ceipt of property.58
As drafted, the amended expatriation tax closes only one of
the three loopholes: tax-avoidance by wealthy expatriates under
the subjective motivation test.59 The amendments replace the
subjective motivation test with an objective wealth test which
makes tax-avoidance theoretically impossible. It does not elimi-
nate tax-avoidance by expatriates who wait ten years before real-
izing income under the Code and regulations. The amendments
partially address tax-avoidance through foreign investment, but
only to the extent that the taxpayer owns fifty percent of a for-
eign corporation. This does not prevent tax-avoidance when a
taxpayer has a diversified portfolio and invests in several foreign
corporations or limits his or her stock interest in a foreign corpo-
ration to forty-nine percent.
53. Id. § 368 (1996). A taxpayer structuring this type of transaction also runs the
risk of a reallocation of income and deductions under Section 482 which allows the Secre-
tary of the Treasury to reallocate income among taxpayers when the business is controlled
directly or indirectly by the same interest for tax-avoidance purposes. The Secretary could
treat the Section 368 reorganization as a sale of a capital asset subject to tax under Section
61(a)(3).
54. I.R.C. § 877(c)(2) (1996).
55. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, § 511(c) (to be codi-
fied at I.R.C. § 877(d)).
56. 1996 TAX LEGISLATION: LAW AND EXPLANATION 109 (CCH., 1996).
57. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, § 511(c) (to be codi-
fied at I.R.C. § 877(d)).
58. Id.; see also Joint Comm. Report, supro note 44.
59. But see supra text accompanying note 46.
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IV. THE AMENDED EXPATRIATION TAX AND CURRENT
BILATERAL TAX TREATIES-THE TAXPAYER'S PERSPECTIVE
In the amended expatriation tax, Congress created a new
loophole that arises in the context of bilateral tax treaties. A
taxpayer could use this loophole to argue that the amended tax
violates the terms of tax treaties and, therefore, under existing
law, the treaty controls. A court that finds this argument per-
suasive will be forced to allow the tax treaty to shelter the tax-
payer from tax liability under the expatriation tax.
The primary motive underlying tax treaties is to create a fo-
rum which facilitates international trade and investment.60 This
is accomplished by eliminating barriers to the "international ex-
change of goods and services and the international movement of
capital and persons."61 Tax treaties effect this forum through
bilateral agreements geared toward avoiding the two most seri-
ous tax barriers: double taxation and fiscal evasion.62 Thus, the
focus in treaty negotiations often centers on drafting a treaty
that coordinates the mutual exchange of information to limit fis-
cal evasion and a system for ceding taxing jurisdiction to avoid
the incidents of double taxation.
63
Double taxation usually occurs when one country taxes on
the basis of residence and another country taxes on the basis of
source.64 Double taxation can also arise when two treaty coun-
tries reach inconsistent resident determinations.65 However, an
expatriation tax also has potential for double taxation. For ex-
ample, if the United States exercises its taxing jurisdiction pur-
suant to the amended expatriation tax and the former citizen's
new country seeks to tax the same income or disposition of assets
60. WILLIAM H. NEWTON, III, INTERNATIONAL INCOME TAX AND ESTATE PLANNING, §
5.02, n.5 (1995). See also Eric J. Smith, The U.S.-Mexico Tax Treaty, 8 FLA. J. INT'L L. 97,
98 (1993) (citing International Aspects of United States Income Taxation: Proposals on
United States Income Tax Treaties, 2 A.L.I. 1 (1992)).
61. Smith, supra note 60, at 98.
62. NEWTON, supra note 60, § 5.02. See also supra text accompanying notes 27-29.
63. Smith, supra note 60, at 98.
64. NEWTON, supra note 60.
65. In the treaty context, both residence and citizenship are determined by each
treaty partner's internal law. It is possible for a taxpayer to be a resident of two or more
countries. In addition, a taxpayer could be considered a citizen of one country and a resi-
dent of another. This may lead to double taxation where one country, for example the
United States, levies taxes based on citizenship and another country taxes the income
based on resident status.
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under its internal tax laws, the expatriate will end up paying tax
twice on the same income. An income tax treaty eliminates the
incidents of double taxation of expatriates in one of the following
ways: 1) the treaty would not preserve the right of the country to
tax its former citizens-saving clause does not expressly mention
former citizens; 2) the general treaty provisions provide relief
from double taxation apply; and 3) pursuant to the taxpayer's re-
quest, the "competent authorities" 66 of the two countries reach an
agreement to alleviate double taxation.67
A. The Saving Clause-A Vehicle for Capturing
and Avoiding Taxes
Most U.S. tax treaties contain a saving clause.68 Generally,
a saving clause reserves the United States a right to tax its resi-
dents and both present and former citizens regardless of the
treaty's other terms.69 One particular issue that arises in the ex-
patriation context is whether the saving clause provision allows
the United States to retain taxing jurisdiction over a former citi-
zen. 70
66. The third method for avoiding double taxation will not be examined here because
it is beyond the scope of this Comment. Such analysis must be case specific taking into
consideration the relationship between the treaty partners.
67. Joint Comm. Report, supra note 44.
68. MERTENS LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 45.32.30 (Cum. Supp. Jan. 1996).
See also MERTENS LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX § 45.32 (1995).
69. For example, the saving clause in the United States and Mexico tax treaty pro-
vides:
Notwithstanding any provision of the convention except paragraph 4, a Con-
tracting State may tax its residents (as determined under Article 4 (Residen.
ce), and by reason of citizenship may tax its citizens as if the Convention had
come into effect. For this purpose, the term 'citizen" shall include former citi-
zen whose loss of citizenship had as one of its principal purposes the avoidance
of tax, but only for a ten year period following such loss.
Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion
with Respect to Taxes on Income, with Protocol, Sept. 18, 1992, U.S.-Mex., S. TREATY Doc.
NO. 103-07, art. 3[hereinafter Double Taxation Treaty].
70. Since the United States is virtually alone in taxing its citizens, the Treasury must
negotiate with treaty partners to reserve the United States a right to tax its citizens
abroad. Absent a bilateral agreement to exchange information, the United States would
have difficulty determining the amount of income earned by citizens abroad and foreign
taxes paid that are creditable against the taxpayer's U.S. taxes. A saving clause may fur-
ther broaden the scope of U.S. taxing jurisdiction because some saving clause provisions
broaden the definition of citizen to include a former citizen whose primary reason for expa.
triating is tax-avoidance. See, e.g., Id.
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The trend among recent saving clause provisions is to ex-
pressly preserve the United States' right to tax its former citizens
under certain circumstances, notwithstanding any other provi-
sion in the treaty. 71 This illustrates the "U.S. discomfort with the
notion of constraining domestic taxing authority through an in-
ternational agreement."72 Currently there are three types of
saving clauses. These saving clauses include: 1) saving clauses
that apply to current citizens, but do not expressly mention for-
mer citizens (Class I); 2) saving clauses that apply to current and
former citizens for ten years after the loss of citizenship if such
loss had for one of its principal purposes tax-avoidance (Class
II); 73 and 3) saving clauses that apply to citizens after the loss of
citizenship regardless of the reason for the loss (Class III).
74 Of
the forty-five saving clauses in currently existing tax treaties,
forty-one fall within Class I or Class 11.
75
1. Crow: Tax-Avoidance Under the Original Expatriation
Tax
The original expatriation tax was enacted as part of the
Foreign Investors Act of 1966 (FITA).76 Section 110 of FITA
provided that "[n]o amendment made by this article shall apply
in any case where its application would be contrary to any treaty
obligation of the United States." 77 Thus, Congress made it clear
that no provision in FITA, including the expatriation tax, should
be construed in a manner that conflicts with U.S. treaties.
Crow v. Commissioner,78 the seminal case on expatriation,
reaffirmed congressional intent that a FITA provision should
give deference to U.S. treaties when a conflict arises. The issue in
Crow was whether the former United States-Canada Tax Treaty,
which precluded the United States from taxing U.S. capital gains
earned by Canadian residents, prevented the application of the
71. Richard L. Dorenberg, Overriding Tax Treaties: The U.S. Perspective, 9 EMORY
INT'L L. REV. 71, 72-73 (1995).
72. Id.
73. See, e.g., Double Taxation Treaty, aupra note 69, at art. 3.
74. Joint Comm. Report, supra note 44.
75. Id.
76. Foreign Investors Tax Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520, 1620-1624.
77. Id.
78. 85 T.C. 376 (1985).
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original expatriation tax.7 The court concluded that the treaty
prevented the United States from exercising its taxing jurisdic-
tion over its former citizens' capital gains income realized after
the former U.S. citizen became a Canadian resident.8o Because
the treaty contained a Class I saving clause, the United States
did not retain the right to tax its former citizen after expatriation
without regard to other treaty provisions. 8' In effect, the capital
gain provision in the tax treaty trumped the original expatriation
tax.8 2 Therefore, the narrow impact of the Crow decision is the
creation of an additional avenue for tax-avoidance-treaty-
shopping. A broader reading of Crow supports the proposition
that a tax treaty controls when a FITA provision and the treaty
conflict.
2. Crow: Tax-Avoidance Under the Amended Expatriation
Tax
Section 110 of FITA clarified congressional intent that the
original expatriation tax should not be construed to conflict with
tax treaties.8 The amended expatriation tax, however, is not as
clear. While the House Ways and Means Committee Report
implied that the amended expatriation tax should not be con-
strued in a manner that conflicts with existing tax treaties,84 no
such language appears in the actual amendments. If the
amendments are interpreted with the legislative history, then
Crow still has persuasive authority. Under a Crow analysis, an
expatriate who becomes a resident in a country that has a Class
I or Class II saving clause may argue that the treaty is in direct
conflict with the amended expatriation tax and the United States
is precluded from taxing the expatriate's income.
Under a Class I saving clause, the taxpayer would argue
that the United States is attempting to tax its former citizen be-
cause the tax is imposed after formal expatriation and the saving
clause only preserves the United States right to tax its current
79. Id. at 377.
80. Id. at 392.
81. Id. at 385.
82. Id. at 392.
83. Foreign Investors Tax Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520, 1620-1624.




citizens. Under Crow, any attempt to tax a former citizen is in
direct conflict with the tax treaty and the United States is pre-
cluded from exercising its taxing jurisdiction over the expatriate.
An expatriate residing in a country with a Class II saving
clause would argue that the United States may not impose its
taxing jurisdiction without first inquiring into the taxpayer's
primary motivation for expatriating. The over broad objective
wealth test does not provide any mechanism to exclude those ex-
patriates who are not renouncing citizenship for tax-avoidance
purposes. Clearly, the treaty partner underscored the impor-
tance of a tax-avoidance motive by including that requirement in
its saving clause. The United States cannot exercise its taxing
jurisdiction if such an exercise would directly conflict with the re-
quirement that the United States first determine that the tax-
payer's primary motive is tax-avoidance. Therefore, a former
citizen may use the Crow argument to avoid the amended expa-
triation tax in both Class I and Class II treaty countries. A for-
mer citizen could not make a Crow argument in a Class III
treaty country because those countries permit the United States
to exercise taxing jurisdiction over a former citizen irrespective of
motive.8
The expansion of taxing jurisdiction over long-term residents
relinquishing residency under the amended expatriation tax
violates all tax treaties, regardless of which type of saving clause
it contains. There is not a single treaty saving clause that pre-
serves the United States' right to tax its former long-term resi-
dents.8 Thus, any attempt to tax a long-term resident, where
such tax would contravene another tax provision in the treaty
expressly prohibiting taxation, is in direct conflict with the
treaty.87 Under Crow, the treaty controls.
85. For a sunmmary of countries falling within Class I, Class II, and Class HI treaty
savings clauses, see CONGRESSIONAL JOINT CONMIdTTEE PRINTS, J.C.S.-17-95, CONG., SESS.
(Doc. 95-5490) reprinted in Section 877-Expatriation to Avoid Tax, TAX NOTES TODAY,
June 1, 1995, Appendix A.
86. Note that a saving clause never reserves the United States a right to tax its for-
mer residents. The fact that a tax treaty explicitly includes citizens and former citizens
and that it explicitly includes residents without mentioning former residents is an indica-
tion that neither the United States nor the treaty partner ever contemplated an attempt to
exercise such broad taxing jurisdiction. An attempt to tax former residents, if enforced,
could be construed as a material breach of the tax treaty.
87. Former Secretary of Tax Policy, Leslie Samuels, foreshadowed the treaty con-
flicts relating to the taxation of former citizens and residents under the amended expa-
triation tax. 'The Committee is also aware that certain existing income tax treaties may
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If a court determines that the amended expatriation tax's
legislative history is persuasive, then Crow is still on point.
When a former citizen moves to a Class I or Class II saving
clause country, the former citizen can argue that the United
States lacks taxing jurisdiction. A former resident can argue
that Class I, Class II, and Class III saving clauses directly con-
flict with the amended expatriation tax, and, therefore, the
United States lacks taxing jurisdiction. The surprising effect is
that this analysis rewards those expatriates who treaty-shop and
penalizes those who do not. Those failing to treaty-shop are ob-
viously not expatriating to avoid taxes, nor are they the taxpay-
ers the amendments intended to capture. These expatriates
would not have been subject to taxation under the former taxing
regime. Instead, this analysis allows the tax-motivated expatri-
ate to become an unintended beneficiary by ensuring tax-
avoidance through treaty-shopping. The tax-avoiding expatriate
runs a greater risk of taxation under the former regime if the
Commissioner determines that his or her subjective motive was
tax-avoidance.
V. TREATY OVERRIDE UNDER THE AMENDED EXPATRIATION
TAx-THE COMMISSIONER'S PERSPECTIVE
Crow is not a guarantee to tax-avoidance for tax-motivated
expatriates. Since the enactment of FITA and the Crow decision,
much has changed in Congress' posture toward treaty override.
The Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988 (TAMRA)
generally, and the codification of the "later-in-time rule" in Sec-
tion 7852(d) of the Internal Revenue Code specifically, demon-
strate Congress' proclivity for overriding tax treaties.
Under present law, U.S. statutes and treaties are on a theo-
retical paritym Both have the force of federal law.8 9 Because
not permit the United States to assert its taxing jurisdiction on former citizens or long-
term residents who are residents of such countries . . .. [T]he new provisions [of the
amended expatriation tax] will take precedence over treaties for a period of ten years."
Samuels Testimony, supra note 10.
88. NEWTON, supra note 60, § 5.03.
89. I.R.C. § 894(a) (1996), as amended by The Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue
Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, 102 Stat. 3342 (Nov. 10, 1988), reduced the amount of
deference between domestic legislation and international tax treaties to "due regard.' Due
regard in this context is determined by Section 7852(d), which provides: '[flor purposes of
determining the relationship between a provision of a treaty and any law of the United
States, affecting revenue, neither the treaty nor the law shall have preferential status by
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they are equal, there is a need to establish a system for deter-
mining primacy. The mechanism for determining primacy in the
United States is the "later-in-time" rule. The "later-in-time" rule
provides that an inconsistent, subsequent federal statute, in this
case the amended expatriation tax, would preempt a provision in
an earlier tax treaty.
The premise that internal laws can now override interna-
tional tax treaties has not only been accepted by Congress, 90 but
also by the Supreme Court. A series of Court opinions, long be-
fore the enactment of Section 7852(d), legitimized Congress' carte
blanche power to override tax treaties.91 For example, in Whit-
ney v. Robertson,92 the Court explained that the "later-in-time"
rule, now codified in Section 7852(d), is "[t]he duty of courts ...
to construe and give effect to the latest expression of sovereign
will."93
The amended expatriation tax does not contain an express
provision like FITA Section 110 that expressly disfavors treaty
override. This absence in light of the codification of the "later-in-
time" rule and the precedent of Whitney and its progeny create
an environment ripe for treaty override. The Commissioner
could validly argue that Congress did not include a provision like
FITA Section 110 in the amended expatriation tax because it in-
tended to override tax treaties. In fact, Congress did contem-
plate and intend treaty override because it was considered
throughout the legislative history. 94
Congress recognized that treaty override could occur, and its
decision not to include a provision deferring to tax treaties in
cases of conflict demonstrates that Congress intended to enforce
this tax irrespective of the international consequences.
As the Crow court noted, "Congress must weigh the potential
for abuse against sound foreign policy considerations. Neither
the [commissioner] through administrative action nor the [c]ourt
through judicial interpretation can substitute its judgment for
reason of its being a treaty or law." In essence, Section 7852, together with Section 894,
places Code provisions and tax treaties on equal ground.
90. Id.
91. See Botiller v. Dominguez, 130 U.S. 238, 247 (1889); The Chinese Exclusion Case,
130 U.S. 581, 600 (1889); Fong Yue Ting v. U.S., 149 U.S. 698, 721 (1893).
92. 124 U.S. 190 (1887).
93. Id. at 195.
94. See supro note 87.
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that of Congress in these matters.."95 In other words, it is not the
duty of the court to reconstruct what Congress failed to include.
Although a tax-motivated expatriate could argue that a spe-
cific tax treaty directly conflicts with the amended expatriation
tax, it is unsettled whether Crow or the "later-in-time" rule con-
trols. Courts enforcing the amended expatriation tax face a
double-edged sword. On the one hand, if a court enforces the
amended expatriation tax, it may violate tax treaties between
the United States and Class I, Class II, or Class III saving clause
countries, and such a decision may disregard Congress' implicit
intent to respect these treaties as evinced by the legislative his-
tory. On the other hand, if a court does not enforce the amended
expatriation tax, it rewards treaty-shopping and frustrates the
purpose of the amendments by generating another loophole.
VI. ALTERNATIVES TO TREATY OVERRIDE AND TAX-
AvoiDANCE: AMENDING AMENDMENTS
The potential for treaty override is not something that
United States' treaty partners will take lightly.9 6 While review-
ing the proposed legislation, the Joint Committee on Taxation
noted that the United States could renegotiate Class I, Class II,
and Class III tax treaties.97 Assuming the possibility that some
countries will renegotiate tax treaties, "this provision [of the ex-
patriation tax] does not change the fundamental nature of the
treaty override: our treaty partners entered into a bargain with
the United States that they did not expect to be broken unilat-
erally."98 Moreover, if the United States does not clarify its in-
tended or unintended position on treaty override and courts en-
force the amended expatriation tax under the "later-in-time"
rule, a protesting treaty partner could seek a remedy under Ar-
ticle 60 of the Vienna Convention which states, "material breach
of a bilateral treaty by one of the treaty parties entitles the other
to invoke the breach as a ground for terminating the treaty or
suspending its operation in whole or in part."99 Below are some
suggestions that could reduce the potential conflicts between the
95. Crow, 85 T.C. at 393.
96. Samuel& Teatimony, supra note 10.
97. Id.
98. Id.




amended expatriation tax and tax treaties.
A. Amending the Incidence of Double Taxation
The Treasury Department foreshadowed the potential for
double taxation before the enactment of the amended expatria-
tion tax.'0° As one might expect, the Treasury Department,
which has the primary responsibility for tax-treaty negotiations,
suggests an alternative to statutory override of Class I, Class II,
and Class III tax treaties. The Treasury contends that the
meaning of the term "United States citizen," undefined in tax
treaties, could be modified to prevent statutory override of tax
treaties. 10 1 The United States could redefine "United States citi-
zen" for expatriation tax purposes. The amended expatriation
tax imposes a tax on long-term residents meeting certain resi-
dency conditions. As noted earlier, a tax on former long-term
residents will conflict with Class I, Class II, and Class III treaty
saving clause provisions because the United States is attempting
to impose its taxing jurisdiction over a former resident. 0 2 The
United States could expand the definition of U.S. citizen to in-
clude certain long-term residents who reside in the United States
for eight out of fifteen years. By expanding this definition, the
United States may exercise its taxing jurisdiction over the former
long-term resident, now defined as citizens, in Class III coun-
tries. If the United States altered the objective motivation test to
include a subjective assessment, these former long-term resi-
dents, now deemed citizens, could be taxed in Class I, Class II,
and Class III countries.
Although the term "United States citizen" is undefined in tax
treaties, determinations defining citizenship are traditionally
governed by the Immigration and Nationality Act.' °3  The
100. See supra note 87.
101. Samuela Teatimony, supra note 10. The Treasury's proposal to amend the
meaning of the term 'U.S. citizen" attempted to alter the dates on which a U.S. citizen be-
comes a former citizen for purposes of the proposed deemed sale provision. That provision
is discussed thoroughly in the proposals, but was not enacted with the other amendments.
The Treasury is not cited here for its specific proposal. Rather, it is cited for the proposi-
tion that the term 'U.S. citizen* is malleable and can be altered in existing treaties to pre-
vent treaty override.
102. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
103. See Joint Comm. Report, aupra note 44. See also Immigration and Nationality
Act § 349, 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (1988).
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amended expatriation tax, however, would be imposed on a non-
resident individual, characterized as a citizen for expatriation tax
purposes, who is not a citizen under the immigration statutes.1
°4
The Treasury Department argues that the United States is
free to interpret undefined treaty terms by referencing the defi-
nition that is in effect at the time of interpretation. 10 5 Even
though assessing a meaning contrary to that which was agreed
upon in treaty negotiations may be interpreted as an implicit
treaty override under internal law, it is not an explicit treaty
override warranting international remedies under Article 60 of
the Vienna Convention.'1
6
B. Modification of the Former Subjective
Motivation Test
The amended expatriation tax violates Class I and Class II
tax treaties insofar as it taxes U.S. citizens without regard to the
individual's primary motive for expatriating. 1'07 The subjective
motivation test under the amended expatriation tax, by itself,
104. Immigration and Nationality Act § 349, 8 U.S.C. § 1481 (1988).
105. See Samuela Testimony, supra note 10. Former Secretary of Tax Policy Leslie
Samuels argues that the Joint Committee on Taxation's concern that the amended expa-
triation tax will violate existing treaties is 'unfounded." The United States interprets the
undefined term U.S. citizen by referencing 'the meaning that is in effect at the time of in-
terpretation" as opposed to the meaning the terms had when the treaty went into effect,
most likely the definition under the Immigration and Nationality Act. This approach, he
argues, is consistent with international norms and will be explicitly stated in the 1995 Or-
ganization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) model income tax treaties.
One could argue, though, that interpreting a tax treaty requires a court "give precise
meaning consistent with the genuine shared expectations of the contracting parties."
Crow, 85 T.C. at 380 (citing Maximov v. United States, 373 U.S. 49 (1963)). The Supreme
Court also noted:
[I]t is particularly inappropriate for a court to sanction a deviation from the
clear import of a solemn treaty between this Nation and a foreign sovereign,
when, as here, there is no indication that application of the words of the trea-
ty according to their obvious meaning effects a result inconsistent with the in.
tent or expectations of its signatories.
Maximov, 373 U.S. at 54.
106. See Vienna Convention, supra note 99. A treaty partner that is also a developing
country could still argue that any attempt to alter the meaning of the term U.S. citizen is
an explicit override of a negotiated treaty. Treaties with developing countries do not fol-
low the model OECD rules because these rules do not serve the special needs of developing
countries.
107. See supra Part IV.A (discussing the conflict between the objective wealth test and
tax treaties).
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW
was an ineffective mechanism to prevent fiscal evasion.'l 8 Pro-
posed legislation could repeal the objective wealth test that vio-
lates Class I and Class II tax treaties and replace it with a moti-
vation test that is both subjective and objective. Elements of
such a test might evaluate whether the expatriate leaves a sig-
nificant presence in the United States as determined by a set of
subjective and objective factors including: checking or savings ac-
count, residence, and presence of a spouse and children. These
factors together, or in some combination, could be used to de-
termine the taxpayer's motive for expatriating.
A restructured subjective and objective test has been intro-
duced and successfully used by Canadian courts to determine ex-
patriate tax motives. In Wassick v. M.N.R.,1°9 the Canadian Tax
Court looked at the nature of time spent in Canada to determine
whether the taxpayer was a resident of Canada for tax purposes.
Despite the fact that the taxpayer lived in Canada for seventy-
five to one-hundred days,"" the court found that the nature of his
time spent in Canada was more like an ordinary resident than a
visiting expatriate.' The court looked to objective factors in-
cluding where the taxpayer maintained his checking account,
whether he had a jointly owned residence with his girlfriend, and
the presence of a child in the country.
1 2
C. Congressional Intent
Congress could avoid the incidents of double taxation, or al-
ternatively treaty override, by explicitly indicating its intent with
respect to the amended expatriation tax. A statement of whether
Congress explicitly intends for Section 110 of FITA to continue to
apply or whether TAMRA Section 7852(d) reflects the intended
relationship between the amended expatriation tax and current
bilateral tax treaties would be instructive to courts enforcing the
amended expatriation tax and to Treasury officials in charge of
renegotiating conflicting tax treaties. Such a statement will lead
108. See supra Part 11.B (discussing the deficiencies under the original expatriation
tax that underscored the need to amend the subjective motivation test).
109. 1994 Can. Tax Ct. LEXIS 3055.
110. A taxpayer must live in Canada for more than 184 days in order to be consider a
resident for tax purposes. Francis, supra note 13.




to either double taxation or treaty override, but at least the en-
forcement of the amended expatriation tax would yield consistent
results domestically and internationally.
VII. POLICY ISSUES
The amended expatriation tax is an over broad and ineffec-
tive means for achieving Congress' objectives. Under the
amended expatriation tax, an expatriate whose primary purpose
for relinquishing citizenship is tax-avoidance can move to a coun-
try with a favorable saving clause provision and potentially avoid
the tax altogether.
A. Horizontal Tax Equity
Horizontal tax equity is a basic precept upon which the
United States tax system rests. "It is virtually a maxim of taxa-
tion that in addition to being fair, a good tax system must be per-
ceived as being fair."113 Horizontal tax equity requires that
similarly situated individuals receive the same tax treatment
unless there are economic hardships that would make it difficult
for a taxpayer to meet his or her tax obligation. 114 Under both
the original expatriation tax and the amended expatriation tax,
the United States government is trying to capture taxes that
would fall due eventually." 5 In theory, the tax attempts to
equalize long-term tax burdens between those who retain citi-
zenship and those who expatriate. In practice, however, the
original and the amended expatriation tax violate principles of
tax equity.
The original and the amended expatriation tax create une-
qual treatment between expatriates and taxpayers who retain
their citizenship. Under the former regime, unequal treatment
resulted when tax-avoiding expatriates abused the subjective
113. Renee Sobel, United States Taxation of Its Citizens Abroad: Incentive or Equity,
38 VAND. L. REV. 101, 103 (1985). See also John H. Christie, Citizenship as a Jurisdic-
tional Basis for Taxation: Section 911 and the Foreign Source Income Experience, 8 BROOK.
J. INT'L L. 109, 132 (1982).
114. John Papahronis, Taxation of Americans Abroad Under ERTA An Unnecessary
Windfall, 4 J. INT'L L. & Bus. 586, 593 (1982) (citing Philip F. Postlewaite & Gregory E.
Sterns, Innocents Abroad? The 1978 Foreign Earned Income Act and the Case for Its Re-
peal, 65 VA. L. REV. 1093, 1115 (1979)).
115. Vagts, supra note 9, at 578.
19961
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW
motivation test, waited for the ten-year window to close or
shifted assets to another country prior to expatriation. The new
regime continues to facilitate unequal treatment among citizen
and expatriate taxpayers by rewarding patient expatriates. It
also exemplifies unequal tax treatment between expatriates and
tax-motivated expatriates. This tax rewards the unscrupulous
who engage in treaty-shopping to effectuate individual tax-
avoidance schemes and penalizes the conscientious with the po-
tential for double taxation.
B. Horizontal Tax Equity in Practice
One of the main objectives of the proposed expatriation tax is
to restore public confidence in horizontal tax equity principles.
"[Plublic confidence in our tax system is eroded by the perception
that some wealthy individuals are able to escape paying taxes
through devices that are not generally available to all taxpay-
ers."11 6 Therefore, in principle, the amended expatriation tax ef-
fectively addresses the horizontal tax equity problems that arise
from the subjective motivation test. It does not, however, dispose
of the horizontal tax equity issues raised by the patient expatri-
ate and foreign investment abuses.
The amended expatriation tax introduces some of its own
challenges to horizontal tax equity-such as incentive to treaty-
shop. Although the extent to which the United States is willing
to go in order to capture a small percentage of the population's
income for purposes of horizontal tax equity remains unclear, it
is clear that this goal can never be achieved under the amended
expatriation tax. The tax will either violate horizontal tax equity
between citizen and expatriate taxpayers who treaty-shop, or it
will violate horizontal tax equity among expatriate and tax-
motivated expatriates.
CmIsTINE L. AGNEW"
116. Samuela Testimony, supra note 10.
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